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ARTICLES 
THE GATT AND THE UNMAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
ROBERT WEIRt 
This paper examines the uneasy relationship between the regulation of 
international trade and international environmental law. In particular, it 
focusses on two GATT panel decisions that struck down US.-imposed trade 
embargoes on tuna products imported from countries that the US. considered 
killed too many dolphins in their tuna fisheries. The implications of the 
decisions went far beyond the immediate environmental issue that faced the 
GATT panels, bringing into question the validity of trade sanctions as a 
means of enforcing and strengthening existing multilateral environmental 
agreements. At the same time, however, a critical examination of the 
American position reveals serious flaws in the environmental policy the trade 
embargoes were meant to support. The article, therefore, concludes that more 
effective international environmental regulations are best pursued through 
cooperative initiatives on the international stage. 
Cet article examine !es relations troub!ees entre la reglementation du 
commerce exterieur et le droit internationale de l'environnement. En 
particulier, !'article examine deux decisions des tribunaux sous le GATT qui 
ont annulees deux embargos imposes par !es Etats-Unis sur du thon importe 
qui venait des pays qui, selon !es Etats-Unis, ont tue trop de dauphins 
pendant la peche au thon. Les consequences des decisions vont au-dela de la 
question precise devant !es tribunaux sous le GA TT. !ls mettent en doute la 
validite des sanctions pour renforcer et ameliorer !es accords internationals sur 
l'environnement. Cependant, au meme temps, une analyse critique de la 
position americaine souleve des graves problemes dans la politique 
environnementale que le embargos devaient soutenir. L 'article conclut done 
que la reglementation internationale de l'environnement doit se faire a partir 
d'initiatives cooperatrices. 
t B.A. (Toronto), LLB. anticipated 1996 (Dalhousie). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 30, 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GATT) was opened for signature. 1 The GATT was seen by 
its promoters as a means to achieve international economic stability 
through the liberalization of trade practices. The post-war economic 
order was to be built around free enterprise and access to markets, 
rather than the protectionism that had characterized the pre-war 
period; under the GATT trade disputes would be defused through 
independent arbitration and negotiation before they could lead to 
wider conflicts.2 
At the same time, international concern for environmental law 
was incipient. Development of an international regime for the 
regulation of trade disputes took priority on the diplomatic stage. 
The logic of the elevation of international trade concerns over 
international environmental issues was clear: Nations had gone to 
war over trade but they had not done so over the environment. As 
well, there was little awareness of the potential environmental 
impact from the accelerated development of technology that 
occurred as part of the war effort and the diffusion of this 
technology throughout the world in the liberalized post-war 
economic order.3 International peace and security would be 
achieved through harmonious trade practices. There is evidence that 
the imbalance between trade and the environment as issues of 
international importance remains today, despite the increased 
awareness that degradation of the global environment is as serious a 
threat to international health and security as economic instability. 
Two recent GATT Dispute Settlement Panel decisions have 
highlighted this imbalance. Both decisions concerned u.s. trade 
embargoes on the importation of tuna products that had been 
harvested with unacceptably high levels of incidental dolphin 
mortality. The first panel decision challenged the primary nation 
1 General Agreement on Tariffi and Trade, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 
reprinted in 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
2 For a complete discussion of the history of GATT, see P. Hallstrom, The CATT 
Panels and the Formation of International Trade Law (Stockholm: Juristforlaget, 
1994) at 22-47 [hereinafter The CATT Panels]. 
3 For a discussion of the effects of this rapid technological growth on fisheries re-
sources, see G.D. Taylor, "The Collapse of the Northern Cod Fishery: A Historical 
Perspective" (1995) 18 Dalhousie L.J. 5. 
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embargo [Tuna/Dolphin I].4 The second challenge was brought 
when Mexico declined to press its victory before the GATT Council 
and concerned both the primary and secondary nation embargoes 
[Tuna/Dolphin IIJ.5 In both cases, the GATT panels found that the 
u.s. was in violation of international trade standards and that the 
environmental concern argued in defence of the embargoes-the 
protection of dolphins-did not justify the violations. The 
environmental ramifications of the decisions are far-reaching; the 
decisions bring into question the validity of using trade embargoes 
as a tool for environmental protection. These decisions may serve to 
undermine the effectiveness of such multi-lateral agreements as the 
Montreal Protocol, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES) and the South Pacific Driftnet 
Convention, all of which sanction the use of trade measures to 
enforce international environmental obligations. 
At the same time, however, the imposition of the unilateral 
trade embargoes by the u .s. raises significant problems for the 
future development of international environmental law. South 
nations have decried the use of unilateral trade embargoes by 
developed countries as an intrusion into their sovereignty. 
Specifically, they find it particularly ironic (and inequitable) that 
they are being asked to bear costs to address global environmental 
problems that are the by-product of northern industrialization and 
the failure of the developed world to internalize environmental 
externalities. 6 
This viewpoint was only reinforced by regulations that allowed 
the u.s. to determine the acceptable level of dolphin kill. As well, 
intense competition for tuna resources in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific (ETP) has led to suspicion that the u.s. was not so much 
motivated with concerns for dolphins as in conserving its share of 
the tuna stocks.7 The u.s. action has, in general, raised the thorny 
4 See United States - Restrictions on the Import of Tuna (Mexico v. United States) 
GATT Doc. D/S21/R (3 September 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1564. 
5 See United States - Restriction on Tuna Imports (Netherlands v. United States) 
GATT Doc. D/S32/6 (20 May 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 844. 
6 D.C. Estey, Greening the GATT(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994) at 182 [hereinafter Greening the GATT]. 
7 The Eastern Tropical Pacific region runs from Chile to Southern California. 
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization has reported that stocks 
of yellowfin tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, at which the embargo was aimed, 
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issue of whether or not one country can impose unilateral 
environmental policies on the international community. 
While the u. s. has pursued a unilateralist approach, other 
nations have disavowed this methodology in favour of a multilateral 
approach to the creation of environmental regulation of living 
resources. The South Pacific states have effectively banned large-
scale pelagic driftnet fishing in their waters. This ban has in turn 
been taken up on an international scale. The experiences of the u.s. 
and the South Pacific states merits comparison. 
This paper will take a critical view of the GATT decisions and the 
unilateral action undertaken by the u.s .. First, the Tuna/Dolphin II 
decision will be analyzed and its implications for the future of 
international environmental law highlighted. Second, the 
effectiveness of unilateral trade sanctions will be considered. 
Finally, the paper will consider more effective ways of making and 
enforcing environmental laws on an international scale through an 
analysis of the experience of the South Pacific driftnet fishery. 
II. THE TUNA/DOLPHIN PROBLEM 
In the ETP dolphins travel in the company of yellowfin tuna. 
Fishers, using a technique called "fishing on dolphins,'' spot herds 
of dolphins moving along the surface of the ocean. They then 
pursue and encircle the dolphins with large purse seine nets. The 
nets are wynched at the top and bottom, trapping both the 
dolphins at the surface and large schools of tuna travelling beneath 
the dolphins. Enmeshed, the dolphins either drown or injure 
themselves trying to escape. Dead dolphins are not weighed, 
processed, or sold; they are merely thrown overboard. 
Estimates of the number of dolphins killed in purse seining vary 
widely. Environmental groups have estimated that 1,650,00 
dolphins were killed in the 1980s-an average of 23 dolphins per 
hour.8 More conservative estimates put the dolphin mortality for 
are fully exploited. One of the reasons for the state of the stocks is the failure of na-
tions fishing in this region to agree on adequate conservation measures. See World 
Review of Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Stocks: PAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper No. 337 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 
1994). 
s Animal Rights: Heinz, Purina, and All Canned Tuna, National Boycott News, 
Spring/Summer 1989, cited in K.L. Holland, "Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use 
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the same period at approximately 750,000. 9 Reasons for the 
discrepancies reflect both the politically charged nature of this 
issue-mortality rates can be used to sway or soothe public 
opinion- and the simple fact that there has been little accurate 
reporting of dolphin mortality. 10 However, both perspectives agree 
that the incidence of mortality has been in steady decline for the 
past two decades largely due to the corresponding decline in 
yellowfin tuna stocks. Recent studies estimate that dolphin stocks 
in the ETP are stable and some are increasing. 11 
1. Background to Tuna/Dolphin II 
(i) The US. Legislation 
In 1972, the u.s. government enacted the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA). 12 The MMPA seeks to reduce the incidental 
bycatch of marine mammals in the commercial fishery. Subsection 
101 (a) reads: 
S. 101 (a) There shall be a moratorium on the taking and 
importation of marine mammals and mammal 
products ... during which time no permit may be issued 
for the taking of any marine mammal and no marine 
mammal product may be imported into the United 
States except in the following cases: 
(2) Marine mammals may be taken incidentally in the 
course of commercial fishing operations and permits may 
be issued .... 
The MMPA provides for a complicated regulatory scheme under 
which permits or exemptions to section 101 are issued. The 
regulations establish the ceiling for incidental dolphin kill in the 
of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fisherman in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific" (1991) 17 Syracuse]. Int'! L. & Com. 267 at note 32. 
9 Tuna: Current Issues Affecting the U.S. Industry: Report to the Committee on 
Finance (Washington, D.C.: United States International Trade Commission, 
1992)(Chair: D.E. Newquist) at 3-3 [hereinafter USITC Report]. 
10 It should be noted that in 1991 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission (IATTC) implemented an observer plan to better determine and moni-
tor annual mortality figures in the ETP fishery (ibid. at 3-9). 
11 National Research Council, Dolphins and the Tuna Industry (Washington 
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992). 
12 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
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yellowfin fishery for u.s. fishers. 13 The regulations also make it 
illegal to import into the u.s. any fish product where that product 
has involved an incidental kill of marine mammals above the u.s. 
standards. 14 Under section 101 of the MMPA the Secretary of the 
Treasury is mandated to impose trade embargoes on fishing nations 
who exceed the u.s. standards or do not have a "comparable" 
regulatory program. 15 This is referred to as the primary nation 
embargo. Paragraph 101(2)(C) extends the embargo to 
intermediary nations unless those nations can provide reasonable 
proof that they have not imported yellowfin tuna or yellowfin tuna 
products from nations subject to the primary nation embargo 
within the preceding six months. 16 
The underlying purpose of the embargoes reflects an uneasy 
alliance between environmental concerns and natiQnal economic 
self-interest. On the one hand, environmentalists argue that the 
sanctions are a "fundamental component of the international effort 
to ... address the largest slaughter of marine mammals in the 
world." 17 On the other hand, the embargoes are justified by the 
need to protect u.s. fishers, who are subject to the environmental 
regulations, from foreign fishers who would otherwise have a 
competitive advantage in the u.s. market if they were not subject to 
l3 Operational Regulations for Tuna Fishermen, 50 CFR Ch. II§ 219.22 (1990). 
The regulations establish the total numbers of marine mammals that can be taken in 
a year. See§§. (d)(A)(2). They set up a sliding scale of penalties for fishers who ex-
ceed their permitted kill. This scale slides from participation in marine mammal 
safety training to revocation of the fishing permit. See§§. (d)(E)(F) &(G). An oper-
ator's permit will only be suspended if the total allowable kill on three consecutive 
trips is exceeded. 
14 Ibid. §§. (e). 
15 MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §. 101(2)(b)(i)&(ii) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
l6 U.S. legislators have enacted several statutes aimed at conserving wildlife in ar-
eas outside its national jurisdiction. See e.g. African Elephant Conservation Act of 
1988, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4244 (1988); The Endangered Species Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 460/-9; & DriftnetActAmendments 16 U.S.C. 1826 (1990). Together 
with 1990 amendments to the MMPA, the Driftnet Act Amendments mandate that 
trade embargoes are to be imposed on fish products from any nation using a large-
scale pelagic driftnet. See MMPAAmendments, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(E)(1990). 
17 Earth Island Institute, Statement on the Implications of the GATT Panel Ruling 
on Dolphin Protection and the Environment in GATT: Implications for 
Environmental Law, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., (27 September 1991)(Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1991) at 55. 
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the same standards. 18 The GATT panels were clearly more concerned 
with the latter justification. 
(ii) Tuna/Dolphin I 
The implementation of the tuna embargoes revealed domestic 
tension within the u.s. itself. Environmentalists, frustrated by what 
they viewed as a lack of commitment to the goals of the MMPA on 
the part of the federal administration, brought an action in u.s. 
District Court. 19 The Court, noting that the relevant provisions of 
the MMPA were mandatory, granted an injunction forcing the 
administration to implement the embargoes.20 
Following the implementation of the primary nation embargo, 
Mexico, arguing that its right to sell tuna on the u.s. market had 
been violated, requested a GATT dispute-settlement panel to 
adjudicate the conflict. The panel ruled in favour of the Mexican 
position. The Mexican government, however, declined to submit 
the decision to the GATT Council, choosing instead to enter bilateral 
consultation with the u.s. to resolve the matter. As a result of the 
Mexican response, the GATT decision in Tuna/Dolphin I had no 
precedential .value and the embargo remained in effect. 21 
Dissatisfied with the end result of Tuna/Dolphin I, the European 
Union (Eu) and the Netherlands as co-complainants requested the 
18 M.H. Hurlock, "The GATT, u.s. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to 
Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision" (1992) 92 Columbia 
L.R. 2098 at 2112. 
19 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F. 2d 1449 (1991). The imposition of 
the embargoes was opposed by Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher, U.S. 
Ambassador to Mexico John Negroponte, and Assistant Administrator for Fisheries 
William Fox Jr., leading to accusations that the administration was willing to use 
environmental bargaining chips in the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico. See Earth 
Island Institute, supra note 17 at 60. 
20 The nations initially listed under the primary nation embargo were Mexico, 
Ecuador, Panama and Vanuatu. Following an agreement to place international ob-
servers on board their purse seiners, Ecuador and Panama were taken off the list. On 
October 26, 1992, four nations were subject to the intermediary nation embargo: 
Costa Rica, Italy, Japan and Spain. This was down from a total of 21 the previous 
January. See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 2.14. 
21 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 268. For a more complete discussion 
of GATT procedure and state practice under the GATT, including bilateral consulta-
tion, see The GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 11-21. 
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formation of a second dispute settlement panel to consider both the 
primary and intermediary nation embargoes.22 
2. Tuna/Dolphin II 
The u.s. presented two defences for the use of the embargoes 
before the GATT Dispute Settlement Panel. First, they argued that 
the embargoes were justified under Article III. Article III, the 
national treatment obligation, requires that products imported into 
a country cannot be treated differently from "like domestic 
products."23 Failing this, the u.s. argued that the embargoes were 
nonetheless justified under the general exemptions set out in Article 
XX. Specifically, the u.s. argued that the trade embargoes were 
either aimed primarily at the conservation of an exhaustible natural 
resource (Article XX(g)) or necessary to protect animal life (Article 
XX(b)). The panel ruled against the u.s. on both arguments. 
(i) Article III 
The interpretation given to Article III by the GATT panel turned on 
a very precise reading of the term "product." The u.s. held that 
since the domestic tuna industry was subject to the same 
restrictions on dolphin mortality as the foreign industry, this did 
not constitute a discriminatory trade practice. In other words, they 
were applying the same regulatory standards to foreign products as 
they were to their own. The EU and the Netherlands maintained 
that the u.s. regulations were aimed not at tuna as a product but at 
the production methods employed in harvesting tuna, namely 
22 Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand and Venezuela supported the 
EU position as interested third parties. The U.S. found no international support for 
its position. 
23 Article III:2 reads: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported 
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
transportation, distribution or use .... See GATT, supra note 1, 
reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at 889 [emphasis added in panel 
decision]. 
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incidental dolphin kill. Hence, the u.s. measures were excluded by 
the wording of Article III, which only applied to products and not 
to production methods.24 Essentially, this was the same argument 
that had succeeded in Tuna/Dolphin I, and the second panel 
applied the reasoning of the first. 
The panel ruled that the u.s. measures were taken in relation to 
production and had nothing to do with product. As a result, the 
panel held that Article III "could not apply to the enforcement at 
the time or point of importation of laws, regulations or 
requirements that related to policies or practices that could not affect 
the product as such." [emphasis added]25 By separating products 
from their methods of production, the panel was then able to 
determine that the u.s. embargo was a quantitative restriction. As 
such, it was inconsistent with Article XI, which generally prohibits 
such trade restrictions. 26 
(ii) Article XX 
The u.s. argument centred around the GATT exceptions in Article 
XX. 27 Article XX allows contracting parties to impose quantitative 
24 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.8. 
25 See ibid. 
26 Article XI: 1 reads: 
No prohibitions of restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges ... shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party. 
See GATT, supra note 1, reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at para. 5.10. 
27 Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) read: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health: 
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trade restrictions in certain circumstances. Because the drafters of 
the GATT were cautious about allowing parties to impose such 
restrictions (for fear that these restrictions may be abused to create 
disguised trade barriers), GATT panels have consistently given Article 
XX a narrow interpretation.28 The Tuna/Dolphin II panel affirmed 
this interpretative strategy: "The long-standing practice of panels 
has accordingly been to interpret [Article XX] narrowly, in a 
manner that preserves the basic objectives and principles of the 
General Agreement."29 Thus, the trade interests protected under 
the GATT are raised above environmental concerns in interpreting 
Article XX. 3o 
The narrow interpretation of Article XX led to two key 
determinations by the panel. The first determination concerned the 
"extra-jurisdictional" impact of the u.s. regulations. The u.s. argued 
that there was no territorial limitation on measures that a 
contracting party could take outside its jurisdiction to protect 
"exhaustible natural resources." In support of its position, the u.s. 
pointed to several bilateral and multilateral environmental treaties 
that "provided for [trade] measures outside of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the country taking the measures."31 In disposing of 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic products. 
See GATT, supra note l, reprinted in Tuna/Dolphin II at 5.29 & 5.12. 
28 Future panels may narrow the interpretation further. The recently completed 
Uruguay Round Agreement, stipulates that any quantitative trade restrictions must 
be subject to a "least trade-restrictive" test. See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 
50. 
29 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.26. 
30 It has been noted that Article XX does not include specific reference to the en-
vironment. See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 49; M.H. Hurlock, supra note 
18 at 2107. While Article :XX(b) permits restrictions necessary to protect human life 
it is unclear whether this exception would cover such diffuse areas as ozone protec-
tion. As well, evidentiary problems in connecting trade actions taken in response to 
ozone depletion to the protection of human life would be enormous. 
3l See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 3.23. The U.S. cited the enforce-
ment provisions in the 1933 Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and 
Flora in Their Natural State; the 1940 Convention on Nature Protection and Wild 
Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere; the 1950 International Convention for 
the Protection of Migratory Birds; the 1973 Agreement of the Conservation of Polar 
Bears; the 1976 Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals; and the 
1989 Convention on the Prohibition of Fishing with Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnets in 
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the relevance of these treaties for the purposes of the GATT the panel 
stated: 
[T]he agreements cited by the parties to the dispute were 
bilateral or plurilateral agreements that were not 
concluded among the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement, and they did not apply to the interpretation 
of the General Agreement or the application of its 
provisions. 32 
At the same time that the panel dismissed the environmental 
agreements as an interpretative aid to the GATT, it held that nothing 
in the wording of Article XX precluded states from taking actions 
outside their national jurisdiction to conserve exhaustible natural 
resources. Some writers have suggested that this represents a 
substantive step in the interpretation of the GATT and its application 
to international environmental law.33 However, a closer reading of 
the panel report suggests that what it had in mind are trade 
restrictions related to the activity of nationals in a foreign 
jurisdiction, such as vessels flying the flag of the restricting state, 
rather than restrictions placed on the activity of other contracting 
parties.34 
The second determination focussed on the wording of Article 
XX(g). While the panel was willing to accept that dolphins were "an 
exhaustible natural resource" that fell within the wording of Article 
XX(g)35 and a policy to conserve dolphins could be seen as a policy 
to conserve such a resource, the panel narrowed the ambit of Article 
XX(g). The panel held that the words "related to" the conservation 
of an exhaustible natural resource had to mean "primarily aimed at" 
conservation.36 The panel then went on to find that the u.s. trade 
restrictions were not, in fact, primarily aimed at the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource but were "measures taken to force 
the South Pacific. See ibid. at para. 3.21. As well, the U.S. pointed to trade restric-
tion provisions in The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and The 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste 
and their Disposal. See ibid. at para. 3.23. 
32 Ibid. at para 5.19. 
33 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 269. 
34 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.17. 
35 See ibid. at para. 5.13. 
36 See ibid. at para. 5.21. 
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other countries to change their policies. "37 As such, they were not 
excepted from the general provision of the GATT. 
The logical separation in the reasoning of measures aimed at 
conservation from those aimed at other states' practices is 
perplexing. The trade embargo, in order to be effective in 
conserving the exhaustible natural resource, necessarily had to 
influence the policy and practice of foreign states. It was exactly 
those policies and practices, after all, that were contributing to high 
levels of dolphin mortality. However, any trade action taken to 
accomplish this end would automatically violate the GA TT. The 
panel justifies this shift through GATT-specific principles: 
If ... Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting 
parties to take trade measures so as to force other 
contracting parties to change their policies within their 
jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the 
balance of rights and obligations among contracting 
parties, in particular the right of access to markets, would 
be seriously impaired. [emphasis added]38 
The u.s. fared no better under the interpretation of Article 
XX(b). The GATT panel again narrowed the reading of "necessary" 
in the Article. The panel asserted that in order for a trade restriction 
to be necessary for the protection of animal life there had to be no 
less restrictive-or GATT-consistent-option available to the 
offending state. Recalling its reasoning under Article XX(g), the 
panel held that measures taken to force other nations to change 
their policies could not be necessary for the protection of animal 
life.39 Unfortunately, the panel provides no discussion on what less 
restrictive measures could be considered necessary. It seems that 
any trade measure that has the effect of influencing policies or 
practices of other states cannot be "necessary," within the meaning 
of Article XX(b), or "primarily aimed" at the conservation of a 
natural resources, within the meaning of Article XX(g). 
37 See ibid. at para. 5.27. 
38 Ibid. at para. 5.26. 
39 See ibid. at para. 5.38. 
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(iii) Implications of the Panel Decision for International Environmental 
Law 
The GATT ruling underscored a number of problems already extant 
in international environmental law. The decision further questioned 
the effectiveness and, indeed, the integrity of environmental 
agreements negotiated at multilateral fora. By refusing to recognize 
the spirit and validity of many of these agreements, the GATT panel 
effectively made soft law even softer. Without acknowledging the 
importance of non-trade issues, such as the environment, the panel 
ignored the international consensus embodied in these agreements. 
The applicability of the enforcement provisions in these agreements 
has been seriously undermined. It is doubtful that a trade embargo 
enacted pursuant to one of these agreements would be sanctioned 
under the GATT. 
The interpretation of Article III further limits the breadth of 
international environmental agreements. For instance, Article 4(5) 
of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, (the Montreal calls on parties to determine the 
feasibility of banning or restricting importation of products that, 
while in themselves are harmless to the ozone layer, have been 
produced with ozone depleting substances. Following the GATT 
decision, such trade restrictions would not meet the national 
treatment obligation in Article III. A party to the Montreal Protocol 
can impose trade embargoes on ozone-depleting products, 
provided similar domestic restrictions are in force, but not products 
manufactured with ozone-depleting production methods. The 
GA TT decision in Tuna/Dolphin II leaves little room for 
acknowledging that pollution is a transboundary problem-
pollution in one state has direct environmental consequences on 
neighbouring states. It also fails to recognize that the protection of 
such "environments" as the ozone layer is, by nature, a global 
problem requiring global remedies.41 The international community 
40 Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone, 
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991). 
41 The implications of the decision, of course, reach far beyond the Montreal 
· Protocol and other international environmental agreements. German environmen-
tal lobbyists, for instance, have lobbied hard to get their government to impose re-
strictions on the importation of Canadian hardwood products because of the 
clearcutting technique used by the forestry industry. Following the reasoning in 
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has agreed that trade embargoes are an appropriate enforcement 
tool; the GATT ruling has now declared such measures to be invalid. 
The protection of endangered species is also undermined by the 
GA TT decision. While the GATT ruling is hostile towards import 
restrictions aimed at production methods, it is in some ways more 
hospitable to international agreements such as the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 42 that target 
products such as leopard skin and ivory.43 Unfortunately, CITES 
deals exclusively with international trade in endangered species. 
The fact that all cetaceans, including dolphins, are listed on Annex I 
and Annex II of CITES does nothing to prohibit incidental dolphin 
kill in the tuna fishery, as this is a non-trading issue.44 In addition, 
destruction of species habitat through environmentally harmful 
production methods is not addressed in CITES. Trade measures 
designed to protect habitat would likely be in violation of the 
GATT.45 
In closing its decision, the Tuna/Dolphin II panel delivered this 
telling summation: 
The Panel noted that the objective of sustainable 
development, which includes the protection and 
preservation of the environment, has been widely 
recognized by the contracting parties to the General 
Agreement. The Panel observed that the issue in this 
dispute was not the validity of the environmental 
objectives of the United States to protect and conserve 
dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit of its 
environmental objectives, the United States could impose 
Tuna/Dolphin II such trade restrictions would not fall within Article III because 
they would be targeting production and not product. As well, the restrictions would 
not be justified under Article XX(g) because they would be primarily aimed at forc-
ing a foreign government to change its harvesting policies and practices and not at 
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. 
42 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, amended 1979, 1983, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
43 See J.P. Trachtman, "GATT Dispute Settlement Panel" 86 American J. ofint'l. 
L. 142 at 151. 
44 See E.A. Norse, ed., Global Marine Biodiversity: A Strategy for Building 
Conservation into Decision Making (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) at 94. 
45 Such conventions as the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals (Bonn Convention), which specifically call for the conservation of 
habitat, would also be vulnerable to a GATT challenge if trade measures were enacted 
to ban products associated with that habitat destruction. 
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trade embargos to secure changes in the policies which 
other contracting parties pursued within their own 
jurisdiction.46 
15 
Contracting parties are protected from the enforcement provisions 
of treaties and agreements, which are aimed at gaining compliance 
with international environmental standards, by virtue of having 
access to dispute settlement under the GA TT. Progressive 
environmental principles, such as sustainable development, have no 
persuasive value in the GATT forum. 
(iv) Reaction and Responses to the GATT Decisions 
Domestic reaction to Tuna/Dolphin I in the United States was 
vitriolic. Ralph Nader called the GATT process "antidemocratic" and 
predicted that the decision would "turn the GATT into a weapon of 
mass destruction for the environment and environmental laws 
around the world."47 Steven Shrybman, counsel for the Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, spoke with a more reflective tone: 
"In many ways the objectives of liberalized or free trade represent 
an agenda for deregulation, and the consequences of such a policy 
for the environment are very problematic."48 The GATT panel in 
Tuna/Dolphin II may have had such criticism in mind when they 
washed their hands of the issue: "The Panel noted that the 
relationship between environment and trade would be considered in 
the context of preparations for the organization of the World Trade 
Organization. "49 To date, little progress has been made on 
integrating environmental policy with trade issues within the GATT 
or the proposed World Trade Organization.5° 
More positive responses to Tuna/Dolphin I were reflected in the 
ground swell of public and congressional support for building 
environmental protection into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Pressure on the Bush administration to push 
for a side agreement on the environment within the N AFT A 
46 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.42. 
47 Testimony of Ralph Nader before the Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment (27 September 1991), supra note 17 at 63. 
48 Testimony of Steven Shrybman before the Subcommittee on Health and the 
Environment (27 September 1991), ibid. at 77. 
49 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 5.43. 
50 See Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 50. 
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negotiations has been attributed to the intensity of the national 
debate following Tuna/Dolphin l.51 In response to the concern over 
the incompatibility of GATT with environmental protection, the 
GA TT Council called for a meeting of its working group on trade 
and the environment. Created in 1972 as part of the general 
provisions of the Stockholm Declaration,52 the working group had 
never met prior to 1991. Moreover, the report submitted by the 
group confirmed the panel decision in Tuna/Dolphin I. It 
cautioned that environmental protection could be used as a 
disguised trade barrier, emphasized the role of GA TT as a trade 
panel, and suggested that any moves to incorporate environmental 
considerations into the interpretation of the GATT would necessitate 
amendments to the General Agreement.53 
The call to reform the GATT along environmental lines has been 
widely taken up following the decisions. Much of the response has 
been creative. Proposals for an amended exception to the GATT, a 
hypothetical Article XX(k), have called for recognition that trade 
measures taken to enforce multilateral and bilateral environmental 
treaties and conventions should serve as a general exclusion to the 
trade obligations in the GATT.54 As well, broadening Article III to 
include production methods would allow countries to target 
sources of pollution rather than just harmful products.55 Daniel 
Estey has called upon environmentalists to use the GATT as a model 
for international dispute resolution. His proposed Global 
Environmental Organization would "serve as an honest broker in 
transnational environmental disputes, assessing risks and benefits 
from environmental threats and allocating costs and cleanup 
responsibilities."56 While each of these proposals would serve the 
desired end of integrating environmental protection into the GATT, 
5l P. Low, Trading Free: The GATT and U.S. Trade Policy (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993) at 31. 
52 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, 5 June 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 
I.L.M. 1416. 
53 See GATT Secretariat 1992 Study on Trade and Environment, cited in The 
GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 95. 
54 See M.H. Hurlock, supra note 18 at 2148 & Greening the GATT, supra note 
6 at 221. 
55 See M.H. Hurlock, ibid. at 2157. 
56 Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 230. 
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actual moves to amend the GATT have been disappointing.57 It is 
ironic that the same states responsible for such documents as the 
Montreal Protocol and CITES seem so reluctant to incorporate 
similar principles into the GATT. 
The above-mentioned proposals all focus on multilateral 
solutions to the concerns raised in the Tuna/Dolphin decisions. 
Other proposals, such as amending Article XX(b) to include 
protection of the environment,58 leave room for unilateral trade 
measures outside of existing international agreements. Underlying 
the Tuna/Dolphin II decision, however, is a reluctance to sanction 
unilateral trade measures. In this way, the GA TT reflects many 
concerns existing in international law generally. Unilateral action is 
viewed by many states as a roadblock to the implementation of 
workable international laws. In the environmental regime, 
multilateral actions have been effective in developing general 
principles as well as effective agreements on conservation and 
environmental protection. While the GATT decisions raise serious 
questions as to the future enforcement of international 
environmental law, it may be equally true that the u .s. action 
impedes the progress of effective solutions to global environmental 
problems. 
III. UNILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE ARGUMENT 
AGAINST THE U.S. POSITION 
1. Conservation Flaws in the U.S. Regulations 
Proponents of the yellowfin tuna embargoes have proffered three 
justifications for their implementation: First, they protected 
dolphins; second, they were necessary to maintain the competitive 
57 The recently completed Uruguay Round amendments to the GATT on counter-
vailing measures and subsidies have again failed to include environmental protec-
tion on the list of GATT exceptions, although they were brought up in the negotia-
tions. The Uruguay Round has confirmed that lower environmental standards in 
the exporting country are not a justification for countervailing measures. See The 
GATT Panels, supra note 2 at 91. 
58 See C. Arden-Clarke, "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development", World Wildlife 
Discussion Paper Qune 1991), cited in M.H. Hurlock, supra note 18 at note 302. 
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equality of u.s. tuna fishers;59 and third, they represented u.s. 
frustration with the failure of enforcement mechanisms in existing 
multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, the GATT decisions, 
in many ways, underscore the failure of the international 
community to implement effective rules concerning environmental 
protection. 60 These proponents, however, have largely ignored the 
effect of these regulations on the conservation prospects for 
yellowfin tuna. 
The first thing to recognize in addressing unilateral 
enforcement of conservation regulations is that those standards are 
not open to criticism or input from countries with a similar interest 
in the yellowfin resource. By placing itself on a higher moral plane 
than other nations in the ETP, the u.s. was asserting a preferential 
right in the reduction of dolphin mortality. However, the u.s. 
regulations do not seriously reduce the potential numbers of 
dolphins killed. Under the regulations the total allowable kill in 
1993 for all dolphin species in the yellowfin fishery exceeds 
50,000,61 a number well higher than even conservative estimates of 
total annual kill in the ETP.62 Further, the experience of u.s. tuna 
fishers in the ETP showed that the regulations were not working. 
The USITC reported that the u.s. fishers who remained in the ETP, 
like most foreign fishers, were forced to sell their yellowfin catches 
on foreign markets because "much of the harvest was dolphin un-
safe."63 As well, the stipulated kill per set of 3.89, when applied to 
smaller fishing nations, does not equitably address overall stock 
abundance. A country with a comparatively small purse seining 
fleet-such as Vanuatu, which was put under the primary nation 
embargo when its fishers exceeded u.s. prescribed levels in 198864-
is subject to the same restrictions as the more extensive fleet of the 
United States. While smaller fishing states do not contribute to 
overall depletion of dolphin stocks to the extent that the larger 
fleets of Mexico and the United States do, they are nonetheless 
59 See discussion supra note 7. 
60 See J .P T rachtman, supra note 43 at 151. 
61 Operational Regulations far Tuna Fishermen, supra note 13 at§§. d(A)(2). 
62 The total incidental kill of dolphins in the ETP for 1991 was 27,300. See usrTC 
Report, supra note 9 at 3-2. 
63 Ibid. at 3-18. 
64 Jbid. at 3-7. 
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subject to the same regulatory burden.65 The u.s. regulations have 
the effect of making each participant in the yellowfin fishery 
equally responsible for dolphin conservation without considering 
the relative impact each participating state has on overall dolphin 
mortality. 
The second flaw in the regulations and the enforcement of the 
embargoes is that they may have had a negative impact on the 
conservation of the yellowfin stocks in the ETP. Herds of dolphins 
in the ETP associate with schools of moderate to large yellowfin.66 
One of the adverse effects of the embargoes was to force nations to 
target smaller yellowfin before they had reproduced. Venezuela 
argued that the u.s. regulations were short-sighted and threatened 
the long-term viability of the tuna stocks. The Venezuelans stated: 
"The embargos ... were not only barriers to trade but [barriers] to 
responsible eco-system management."67 The exclusive focus on 
dolphins may have blinded the u.s. to broader concerns of species 
bio-diversity and eco-system management. 
A third flaw in the u.s. regulatory system is that it did not 
encourage or promote more sustainable fishing methods but 
preserved the purse seiner status quo. Bait fishing or long liners do 
not involve incidental dolphin mortality. As well, lower yields in the 
tuna harvest associated with these techniques assist the long-term 
sustainability of the resource. Because purse seining is economically 
more efficient in the short-term, the u.s. position has been to focus 
on modifications of current methods.68 Unfortunately, the National 
Research Council reports that it was 
unable to identify any currently available alternative to 
setting nets on dolphins that is as efficient as dolphin 
seining ... [or] any experimental modifications to gear 
or techniques of catching dolphin-associated tuna that 
65 For a description of the fleet sizes of the participants in the ETP yellowfin fish-
ery, see Ad Hoc Consultation on the Role of Regional Fishery Agencies in Relation to 
High Seas Fishery Statistics: PAO Fisheries Report No. 500 (Rome: Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1994). 
66 A. Wild, "A Review of the Biology and Fisheries for Yellowfin Tuna, Thunnus 
Albacares, in the Eastern Pacific Ocean", in Interactions of Pacific Tuna Fisheres: 
PAO Fisheries Technical Paper 33612 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations, 1991) 52 at 73. 
67 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.37. 
68 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 3. 
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would reduce dolphin mortality to or near to zero and 
would be practical in the fishery in the immediate 
future. 69 
The embargoes ultimately may have an adverse effect on the 
tuna stocks of the central and western pacific. The USITC reported 
that efforts to minimize costs and improve efficiency in the u.s. 
tuna harvesting and processing industry have "mainly been driven 
by economic considerations such as the cost of energy and 
labour. "7o The higher costs associated with compliance with the 
dolphin-safe policy have been partially blamed for the migration of 
the majority of the u.s. purse seiners from the ETP to the western 
and central pacific.71 As well, the bulk of u.s. capital investment in 
tuna processing avoided adverse economic impacts altogether by 
being relocated to countries in the western pacific not subject to the 
embargoes-a fact which proves that global capital, like pollution 
and tuna fish, is highly migratory and difficult to regulate.7 2 
Increased pressure on the central and western pacific fisheries from 
the economic calculations of the u.s. industry may have long-term 
detrimental effects on tuna stocks in those regions. 
Another plausible reason for the migration of u.s. industry to 
the western and central pacific is that, unlike their counterparts in 
the ETP, stocks of yellowfin tuna in these regions are relatively 
healthy.73 In 1960, the u.s. caught and processed 90% of the ETP 
tuna. By 1991, due to the expansion in the fleet sizes of Mexico, 
Ecuador and Panama, the u.s. share of the resource had been 
reduced to 11 %.74 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, members of 
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) refused to 
69 Ibid at 8. 
70 USITC Report, supra note 9 at 5-1. 
7! In 1989, 29 U.S. vessels, accounting for 26% of the total yellowfin harvest, op-
erated in the ETP. See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 29. By 1992, 
only nine purse seiners remained in the ETP, while the number operating in the 
western and central pacific had increased from 30 in 1988 to 43 in 1992. See USITC 
Report, supra note 9 at D-5. 
72 As of 1990, only one of the major U.S. tuna processors was operating within 
the U.S .. The others had sold their interests to Thai and Indonesian companies. See 
National Research Council, ibid at 31. 
73 Yellowfin stocks in the central and western pacific are lightly exploited. See 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 337, supra note 7 at 27. 
74 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 3. 
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adhere to the catch limits set by the regulatory body because 
countries such as Mexico, who did not participate in IATTC, were 
operating independent of international regulatory control.75 As a 
result, IATTC lost all credibility as an effective regulatory body76 and 
the yellowfin tuna stocks are now fully exploited.77 The same 
misfortune may befall the stocks of the western and central pacific. 
2. The U.S. Action Under International Law: Rio and UNCLOS 
Intense competition for yellowfin tuna resources in the ETP led the 
Australians to suggest that the regulatory measures taken by the u.s. 
to limit dolphin mortality were, in fact, aimed at controlling the 
international trade in ETP yellowfin tuna.78 Their statement reflects 
a general suspicion of the American policy. The u.s. holds 31 % of 
the world's tuna market.79 By closing that market to dolphin-unsafe 
tuna caught in the ETP, the u.s. could confer an economic 
advantage on their tuna fishers who had largely moved away from 
the ETP, while at the same time forcing nations fishing in the ETP to 
find other markets or catch less tuna. This theory, however, is 
insupportable for a number of reasons. One, it was 
environmentalists who forced the administration to impose the 
embargoes. Two, part of the reason the u.s. fishers left the ETP was 
due to the increased cost of meeting the regulatory standards. 
75 See usrTc Report, supra note 9 at 4-3. 
76 The current membership in IATTC includes only Costa Rica, France, Japan, 
Nicaragua, Panama, the U.S., Vanuatu and Venezuela. Mexico, Ecuador and Chile, 
with their large yellowfin fleets, are not members. IATTc's role in the regulation of 
the ETP tuna fishery is limited to gathering scientific information, conducting ob-
server programs, and advising the member states on conservation and management 
of the stocks. See FAO Fisheries Report No. 500, supra note 65 at 43. 
77 See FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 337, supra note 7 at 27. In FAO par-
lance, "fully exploited" means the stock is fished at its maximum sustainable yield 
(MsY). MSY calculations are based on the best available science and have historically 
resulted in over-exploitation of stocks managed under this principle. For a more 
complete discussion of the flaws inherent in managing fisheries based on MSY, see 
R.L. Payne, "A Glance Into the Future of the World Canned Tuna Trade" (1994) 
18 Marine Policy 407. 
78 See Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.12. 
79 See National Research Council, supra note 11 at 6. 
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Finally, the effect of the embargoes proved to be damaging on the 
remainder of the domestic processing industry. 80 
The suspicion, however, reflects a growing divide in 
international environmental law between North and South 
countries. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration states, in part: 
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges 
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should 
be avoided. Environmental measures addressing 
transboundary or global environmental problems should, 
as far as possible, be based on an international 
consensus. 81 
Principle 12 was drafted to protect the development interests of 
South nations, who feared that trade measures would be taken by 
North nations to "force acquiescence to northern environmental 
priorities over which legitimate disagreement remains regarding the 
resulting benefits."82 The u.s. trade action can be seen as a direct 
abrogation of Principle 12. The embargoes placed a heavier burden 
on the South nations, where tuna resources contribute more 
significantly to their narrower economic bases. In addition, serious 
and valid points of disagreement concerning the environmental 
soundness of the u .s. regulations were not opened for debate 
among the participating nations in the ETP fishery. Instead, the u.s. 
used its market strength to force unsound conservation and 
resource management strategies on South nations. 
This dispute has long been a sore spot in international fisheries 
management. South nations, with less developed fisheries 
industries, are more dependent on stocks that occur within their 
200 mile limit than North nations with their highly capitalized 
fleets. After stocks are depleted in one region, the North nations 
80 The processing indust1y complained of a number of adverse affects created by 
the embargoes: (1) increased public awareness of traditional dolphin-unsafe harvest-
ing practices had decreased demand for tuna even after the canners moved to dol-
phin-safe labelling; (2) uncertainties in supplies created higher risks; (3) U.S. can-
ners had to compete with the large and growing European market for dolphin-safe 
products. See USITC Report, supra note 9 at 3-18. The Report did, however, ac-
knowledge that the increased demand for albacore was an "unambiguously positive" 
result of the embargoes for U.S. fishers. See ibid. at 3-21. 
81 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. 
NCONF. 151/5/Rev. l, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 at 878. 
82 Greening the GATT, supra note 6 at 187. 
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move on to less exploited areas, leaving the southern states to suffer 
the consequences of overfishing. This pattern, known as "pulse 
fishing,'' has not only contributed to the depletion of much of the 
world's high seas fisheries 83 but to open distrust of northern motives 
surrounding conservation measures. 84 The ease with which the u.s. 
fleet was able to relocate its activities may have contributed to the 
hostility among Southern nations toward the u.s. trade measures. 
The 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
(uNCLos) 85 mirrors the cooperative approach to transboundary 
resource management expressed in Principle 12. UNCLOS recognized 
that individual states could not adequately manage transboundary 
stocks such as tuna fish. Article 64 mandates states whose nationals 
fish for highly migratory species within the same region to 
cooperate through international fisheries organizations in the 
management and conservation of the species. By taking the issue of 
dolphin conservation upon itself, the u.s. was indirectly regulating 
the yellowfin tuna resource. In principle, this unilateral action would 
amount to a violation of the provisions of UN CLOS. 86 
At the Tuna/Dolphin II panel hearing, Venezuela called upon 
the u.s. to respect the principle of cooperation enunciated in 
UNCLOs.87 Venezuela considered the appropriate mechanism for 
regulation of dolphin mortality was through an international 
agreement, which would not only represent all interested parties but 
could also address the more pressing economic issue of conserving 
the yellowfin tuna stocks. 88 Unfortunately, the opposition to the 
u.s. dolphin-safe policy highlights the regional antipathies that exist 
83 The FAO estimates that 70% of the world's high seas fisheries are either fully 
exploited or over exploited. See Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing: PAO 
Fisheries Report No. 484 (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations, 1992). 
84 See]. Carr & M. Gianni, "High Seas Fisheries, Large-Scale Driftnets, and the 
Law of the Sea" in J.M. Van Dyke et al., eds., Freedom for the Seas in the 21st 
Century(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 272. 
85 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 
opened for signature 10 December 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1291. 
86 It should be noted that the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS. 
87 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 5 at para. 4.38. 
88 Indeed, when the GATT panel determined that the U.S. actions were too restric-
tive, or GATT inconsistent, they may have had in mind a cooperative management so-
lution to the dolphin problem. Unfortunately, they failed to spell this out in the de-
c1s10n. 
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in the ETP. The refusal of many coastal states to join IATTC, distrust 
of American motives in imposing the trade embargoes (which was 
compounded by the feeling that the u.s. was largely responsible for 
the dismal state of the yellowfin stocks), and u.s. frustration with 
the failure of states in the region to adequately regulate their fishers 
all contributed to the intractable nature of the regulatory dilemma 
facing the ETP. The GATT challenges were simply the continuation 
of these antipathies played out on a different stage. 
While the ETP has become a regulatory nightmare, which has 
frustrated efforts to protect dolphins and conserve tuna stocks, 
lessons can be learned from looking elsewhere. The South Pacific 
island states have had much greater success in resisting the 
economic muscle of large fishing nations and raising environmental 
conservation to an international plane. The experience of these 
states in working to ban large-scale pelagic driftnets from their 
waters is an instructive and hopeful lesson that states in the ETP 
would do well to observe. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH PACIFIC 
1. Historical Background to the Pelagic Driftnet Convention 
The history of the UN Pelagic Driftnet Resolution (the Driftnet 
Resolution) 89 is important for four reasons. First, it reveals the 
environmentally unfriendly side to American trade embargoes 
related to international fisheries. Second, it provides a contextual 
insight into the North-South dispute in international environmental 
law. Third, it shows how economic concerns can be integrated with 
environmental concerns in natural resource management. And 
finally, it provides a positive role model for environmental 
protection on the international stage. Many of the regulatory 
problems currently facing the ETP have been resolved in the South 
Pacific. 
89 Large-scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine 
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, GA Res. 44/225, UN GAOR, UN ooc. 
A/45/663. 
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The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) 90 is responsible 
for the management of the tuna resources that migrate through the 
combined exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of its member states.9 1 
The FFA was born and galvanized out of international conflict. In 
1976, the u.s. enacted the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (the Magnuson Act).92 The legislation asserted u.s. 
jurisdiction over the living resources within the American EEZ, with 
the one notable exception of tuna. The Magnuson Act also refused 
to recognize the legitimacy of other states' claims over tuna that 
occurred inside their EEZs and allowed the u.s. government to 
impose punitive trade sanctions on any nation that took action 
against u.s. vessels. Many u.s. vessels continued to fish for tuna 
within the EEZs of FFA states under the protection of the Magnuson 
Act despite the fact that those states had claimed jurisdiction over 
the resources under Article 56 of UNCLOS. Article 56 gives coastal 
states exclusive authority to manage the living resources within their 
EEZs.93 The motivation for the u.s. policy was fairly simple: The 
annual landed value of South Pacific tuna fishery in the 1980s has 
been estimated at two billion u.s. dollars. 94 Competition between 
technically advanced distant water fishing fleets, such as Taiwan, 
Japan, and the u.s., made free access to the resource a matter of 
economic importance. 
Faced with threats to their sovereign rights, four South Pacific 
island states arrested American vessels.95 In each case, the u.s. 
responded by imposing trade embargoes on tuna imported from 
90 Convention Establishing the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 197 8, 
reprinted in B. Herr, ed., infra note 101 at 422. 
9 l The FFA consists of 17 member states: Australia, the Cook Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu and Western Somoa. 
92 16 u.s.c. §§ 1801-1882 (1988). 
93 See W.T. Burke, "Highly Migratory Species and the Law of the Sea" (1984) 
14 Ocean Dev. & Int'l. L. 273. 
94 M.L. Lodge, "Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access: Responsible 
Fisheries Management in the South Pacific Regions" (1992) 16 Marine Policy 272 
at 273. 
95 Papua New Guinea arrested the "Danica" in 1982, the Solomon Islands ar-
rested the "Jeanette Diana" in 1984, the Federated States of Micronesia arrested the 
"Ocean Pearl" in 1986, and Kirabati took similar action against a U.S. vessel in 
1987. 
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these countries. The events had two positive consequences for the 
South Pacific states. First, their responses, though limited, proved 
to be effective. The Solomon Islands, for instance, threatened to bar 
all u.s. vessels from its waters and open them instead to vessels from 
the Soviet Union.96 Second, the conflict created regional cohesion. 
In 1987, the two sides negotiated a settlement of the dispute.97 In 
exchange for allowing u.s. vessels into their waters, the member 
states of the FFA received recognition of their jurisdiction over their 
combined EEZ through licensing and access agreements. The 
regional unity that was forged from this conflict has in turn led to 
significant international environmental initiatives. 
Arvid Pardo has asserted that small, developing states, such as 
those in the South Pacific, suffer from "inequitable consequences 
deriving from inequalities in technology and access to open seas."98 
Prior to 1991, distant water fishing nations had exploited their 
technological advantage by fishing with large scale pelagic driftnets 
within the EEZ of the FFA. Driftnets, sometimes reaching 50 kms in 
length, 99 were used because the migratory patterns of tuna are 
poorly understood and the species can be widely dispersed. 
The ecological impact of driftnets is extremely destructive. The 
report of the Secretary General identifies two environmental 
problems with this practice. First, the nets are indiscriminate. As 
well as targeting tuna fish, the nets are responsible for the significant 
bycatch of sea birds, marine mammals and non-target species. 
Second, the impact on the target species is equally devastating. In 
particular, the report identifies the adverse economic impact the 
overexploitation of living resources has on coastal states that are 
particularly reliant on sustaining those resources. 100 Large drifrnets 
are frequently cut loose in adverse conditions and left to comb the 
96 B. M. Tsamenyi, "The Jeanette Diana Dispute" (1986) 16 Ocean Dev. & Int'l. 
L. 353. 
97 See Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island 
States and the Government of the United States, reprinted in K.R. Simmonds, ed., 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea [New Series} (New York: Oceana, 1987) at 9. 
98 A. Pardo, "Perspectives on Ocean Governance", in J.M. Van Dyke et al, eds., 
Freedom for the High Seas in the 21st Century, supra note 84 at 38. 
99 See Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Resources 
of the World's Oceans and Seas, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. AJ45/663 
(1990). 
lOO Ibid. at para. 2. 
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marine ecosystem. As well, the massive capital expenditure required 
to conduct driftnet activities means greater numbers of fish must be 
caught to meet expenses. The cycle is vicious and unsustainable. 
In response to driftnetting, the FFA banded together and issued 
the Tarawa Declaration. 101 The Tarawa Declaration identifies the 
practice as "indiscriminate, irresponsible and destructive." The 
Tarawa Declaration also links the issue of environmental protection 
with the economic interests of the developing states of the FFA, 
noting the importance of a sustainable fishery for "this and future 
generations of Pacific people." The Declaration called on the 
international community to recognize the unsustainable nature of 
driftnet fishing and suggested that the ban on driftnet fishing in the 
South Pacific "might then be the first step to a comprehensive ban 
on such fishing" throughout the world. The Tarawa Declaration 
was ratified by all FFA member states in Wellington, New 
Zealand. 102 
Following adoption of the Wellington Convention driftnets 
have virtually disappeared from the waters of the South Pacific. 103 
The success of the multilateral resolve has been applauded as "an 
important step toward international cooperation and the long-term 
health of the ecosystem on which we depended." 104 
101 Tarawa Declaration, July 1989, reprinted in B. Herr, ed., The Forum 
Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges and Prospects (Institute of Pacific 
Studies: University of the Pacific, 1990) at 437. 
102 Convention to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific, 1989, reprinted 
in K.R. Simmonds, ed., New Directions in the Law of the Sea [New Series] P. (New 
York: Oceana, 1989) 18 [hereinafter the Wellington Convention]. 
103 See G.J. Hewison, "The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on 
Large-Scale High Seas Pelagic Driftnet Fishing" (1994) 25 J. of Maritime L. and 
Comm. 557 at 566. 
104 J. Carr & M. Gianni, supra note 84 at 273. Judith Swan has written: "The 
[Tarawa] Declaration, therefore, was a policy-political decision and strategy, gener-
ated by strong regional infrastructure and collectivism. It reflected South Pacific 
priorities of sound ecosystems and peoples' welfare over a debate about scientific ev-
idence." See J. Swan, "International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing Activities" in 
M. Ross & J.O. Saunders, eds., Growing Demand on a Shrinking Heritage: 
Managing Resource-Use Conflicts (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 
1992) 216 at 240. 
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2. International Acceptance of the Dri&net Resolution 
The Driftnet Resolution adopted many of the initiatives 
expounded in the Wellington Convention. First, it noted both the 
destructive impact on non-target species and the economic impact 
on developing states who fished on a smaller scale. The Resolution 
called for immediate cessation of the activity in the North and 
South Pacific and a global moratorium on large-scale driftnet 
fishing by June 30, 1992.105 
The concerted diplomatic effort to ban driftnet fishing in the 
South Pacific has been continued on an international scale. In 1990 
the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 45/197. 106 The 
resolution reaffirmed the commitment to the global ban called for 
in Resolution 44/225. As of 1994, many nations, including some of 
the largest offenders, had enacted legislation prohibiting their 
nationals from engaging in driftnet fishing on the high seas. 107 As 
well, many international fisheries organizations have issued 
communiques endorsing the moratorium. 108 The accumulation of 
support in the international community for the moratorium has led 
some scholars to argue that the content of Resolution 44/225 meets 
the criteria set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of ]ustice109 for customary international law. 110 
The success of the South Pacific states in promoting regional 
conservation issues on an international scale provides a dramatic 
comparison to the present experience in the ETP. There are many 
reasons why this is so. First, the South Pacific approach has been 
l05 Canada was a strong supporter of the Driftnet Resolution. In its submission, 
Canada called for the termination of the wasteful and destructive practice. Canada's 
main concern was for conserving salmon stocks which were fished on the high seas 
by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. See Submission to the United Nations Office of 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnets (31 August 
1990); Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans Press Release, HQ-B-90-14-3 
(7 November 1990). 
106 Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on the Living Resources on 
the World's Oceans and Seas, UN Doc. A/C-2/45 6.77 (10 December 1990). 
l07 These nations include Japan, Taiwan, the former Soviet Union and the EU. 
See G.J. Hewison, supra note 103 at 576. 
108 G.J. Hewison, ibid. at 573. 
109 Statute of the International Court of justice, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 899 (1972). 
110 G.J. Hewison argues that accepting the morarorium is a general practice rec-
ognized as obligatory by a majority of states. See generally G.J. Hewison, supra note 
103. 
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one of multilateral cooperation. The ETP has remained mired in 
regional distrust. Second, the South Pacific initiative took a 
comprehensive eco-system approach. The Wellington Convention 
recognized that the destruction caused by driftnet fishing could not 
be addressed through attempts to limit the kill of a particular 
species. The Wellington Convention addresses both the 
environmental issues of wasteful incidental bycatch and the 
economic issue of overexploitation of the tuna resources. The u.s. 
approach in attempting to regulate only dolphin kill without regard 
to the state of the yellowfin stocks has only deepened the divisions 
in the ETP. Until there is recognition by the countries in the ETP 
that the two species are inseparable in the eco-system, and that an 
effort to reduce dolphin kill must also consider the precarious state 
of the tuna, further cooperation in the region is unlikely. Third, the 
international community recognized the soundness of the South 
Pacific approach. The U.S has reported that the driftnet moratoria 
in the South Pacific and the corresponding reduction in the 
albacore catch is expected to benefit u.s. fishers by an increase in 
prices because of the smaller harvests and a long-term sustainable 
fishety in which albacore populations are expected to rise. 111 Finally, 
the similarities between the regions should not be ignored. The 
South Pacific initiative came in response to an economic and 
environmental crisis. Stocks of albacore tuna, on which the region is 
highly dependent, were reported to be in threat of serious 
depletion. 112 It has been frequently observed that conservation only 
becomes part of fishery policy in response to crises. 11 3 The ETP is 
now faced with a similar crisis. Failure to regulate the resource 
through multilateral cooperation may well solve the dolphin 
problem at the expense of the tuna: there simply will be no more 
tuna left to fish. 
11 1 See usrTc Report, supra note 9 at xi. 
112 See J. Swan, supra note 104 at 221. 
113 See, for e.g., H.D. Smith, "Theory of Ocean Management" in P. Fabbri, ed., 
Ocean Management in Global Change (London: Elsevier Applied Science 
Publishers, 1993) 19. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Wellington Convention may only survive by the grace of 
having avoided the GATT. Article 3(2)(c) of the Convention allows 
all parties to prohibit the importation of fish products caught with 
driftnets. Embargoes enacted under this provision would not 
withstand a challenge under the GATT. Nevertheless, many member 
states have implemented such legislation. 114 As well, nations outside 
the South Pacific, including the United States, 11 5 have followed the 
lead of the South Pacific states. The fact that the GATT exists as an 
available mechanism to undermine the Wellington Convention and 
yet has not been used is a further testimony to the strength of the 
international resolve to support the moratorium on driftnet fishing. 
In the end, the experience of the driftnet moratorium is 
instructive for both the ETP fishery and the GA TT itself. The 
contracting parties to the GATT and the interpreters of the GATT 
should recognize the international consensus embodied in 
Resolution 45/225. The GATT must be either amended or 
interpretative direction must be supplied to permit trade embargoes 
that are consistent with international environmental initiatives and 
multilateral agreements. By undermining these agreements rather 
than providing valuable support for them, the GATT will continue to 
impede the development of effective international environmental 
law, which, after all, embodies the same multilateral consensus that 
is the foundation of the GATT. 
114 These states include Australia and the Cook Islands. New Zealand considered 
such measures unenforceable in light of the GATT decision in Tuna/Dolphin I, and 
Papua New Guinea declined to implement supporting legislation for fear that its 
processing industry would suffer economic harm. See G.J. Hewison, supra note 103 
at 576. 
115 The U.S. implemented legislation banning importation of driftnet products 
into its territory in 1991. See High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, amend-
ing 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1991). 
